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8 Concluding remarks
Abstract '
This chapter summarizes and concludes the study. Furthermore, It
discusses some policy implications and offers some suggestions for
further research.
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1 Summary and conclusions
The results of the study can be summarized as follows. Chapter 2 shows
that trade unions are economic agents whose behaviour can be integrated in
economic theory to explain wage formation and employment. The impact of
trade unions on unemployment is less clear. This issue is taken up in the
next chapter.
Chapter 3 presents an empirical model of union wage setting, employ-
ment and unemployment. The model is estimated with annual aggregate
data for the Dutch private sector from 1965 until 1987. The results suggest
that the increase of taxes and that of the discrepancy between consumer and
producer prices (partially due to value added taxes) and the increase of
benefits have caused an increase of the equilibrium unemployment rate in
the Netherlands in this period.
Chapter 4 considers whether efficiency wage effects can explain unem-
ployment. The efficiency wage theory argues that it may be profitable for
the firm to pay more than the market clearing wage to increase the workers'
productivity. A theoretical objection is that more complex contracts can be
devised which provide incentives to workers without causing unemploy-
ment. There is some empirical evidence that high wages improve worker
productivity; whether the effect is sufficiently strong and wide-spread to
cause unemployment is questionable. Further, the chapter shows a new
result with respect to the interaction between efficiency wage and insider-
outsider effects. The insider-outsider theory argues that employed workers
(insiders) have more market power than unemployed (outsiders). This
market power enables the insiders to obtain wages above the market
clearing level, while outsiders remain unemployed. The theoretical model
shows that efficiency wage and insider-outsider effects reinforce one
another if the insider has complete market power. Whether this result also
holds in other situations remains to be assessed.
Chapter 5 presents an empirical application of the efficiency wage theory
and the theory of union wage formation. The efficiency wage theory is used
to explain wage drift, whereas the theory of union wage formation is used
to explain contract wage changes. The estimates for the Netherlands (1972-
1983) imply that there is an inverse relationship between contract wage
changes and wage drift. In other words, wage drift reduces the impact of
wage moderation by trade unions on employment.
The analysis of chapter 6 is also based on the theory of union wage
formation. The central question is whether the probability for unemployed
workers to get a job depends on the cause of their unemployment. Two
possible causes of unemployment are distinguished. The first cause of
unemployment is insider-outsider effects. In this situation the union does not
care about unemployed. The second cause of unemployment is lack of
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human capital. This lack may be caused by the duration of unemployment.
It appears that the probability for unemployed workers to get a job depends
on the cause of their unemployment. Under monopoly unionism unprivi-
leged workers (outsiders, untrained workers) are more likely to be hired if
their unemployment was due to a lack of human capital than if the union
does not care about them. Under efficient bargaining unprivileged workers
prefer powerful unionism if their unemployment was due to a lack of
human capital. If their unemployment is due to the fact that the union does
not care about them, powerful unionism may hinder their employment.
Chapter 7 considers the empirical implications of insider-outsider effects
on wages, employment and unemployment persistence. Furthermore, it
provides a survey of empirical studies in this area. It appears that there is
little evidence in favour of a lagged employment effect on the wage rate. It
is clear that unemployment has a negative impact on wages. Long-term
unemployment reduces wages as well, but perhaps at a lower rate than
short-term unemployment. The insider-outsider and duration effects are not
strong enough to cause full hysteresis.
2 Policy implications
The study has the following policy implications. The study of union wage
formation, employment and unemployment of chapter 3 implies that pay-roll
and income taxes, social security contributions, indirect taxes and benefits
may increase equilibrium unemployment. It seems desirable to stabilize or
decrease the tax burden, to reduce the number of workers on sick leave, etc.
The analysis of contract wage changes and wage drift in chapter 5 suggests
that the impact of wage moderation by trade unions is diminished by wage
drift. It further indicates that wage control measures by the government are
not very effective. The theoretical models in chapter 6 suggest that human
capital matters in wage formation. The policy implication of the models is
that a subsidy of training costs may enhance employment of untrained
workers such as long-term unemployed. It is even better, but also more
difficult, to prevent losses of human capital by eliminating long-term
unemployment.
3 Suggestions for further research
The study is concluded by offering some suggestions for further research.
The study of the determinants of equilibrium unemployment in chapter 3
concentrates on imperfect competition in the labour market. If the determi-
nation of wages and prices is considered as 'a battle of the mark-ups' (see
Layard and Nickell (1986)), the analysis can be improved by including
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imperfect competition in the product market. An empirical study along these
lines is provided by Nickell and Kong (1992) for 14 two-digit industrial
sectors in Britain. Chapter 4 shows that insider-outsider and efficiency wage
effects reinforce one another if the insider has complete market power. It
would be interesting to generalize this result in case the insider has no
complete market power. The empirical study of contract wage changes and
wage drift in chapter 5 could be repeated on a larger data set, for example
on panel data of several industries. Chapter 6 presents a static analysis of
the impact of human capital or duration effects on wage formation and
employment. The dynamic impact of human capital or duration effects on
unemployment can be investigated by integrating wage formation theory
and matching theory in a single model. The survey in chapter 7 shows that
insider-outsider effects may cause unemployment persistence. An interesting
subject for further research is whether wages and employment adjust
symmetrically in booms and slumps.
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